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Risk and Return of Publicly 
Held versus Privately 
Owned Banks
1.I n t r o d u c t i o n
n their seminal work, Berle and Means (1932) point out that 
the separation of ownership and control in the modern 
corporation creates a condition whereby the interests of owner 
and manager may diverge and many of the checks that once 
operated to limit the use of power have disappeared. The 
agency theory, formalized by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
posits that the agency costs of deviation from value 
maximization increase as managers’ stakes decrease and 
ownership becomes more disperse.
Countering the incentive problems in the separation of 
ownership and control are the disciplining forces exerted by the 
managerial labor market and the capital market. Fama (1980) 
notes that the signals provided by an efficient capital market 
about the value of a firm’s securities are likely to be important 
for revaluations of the firm’s management. Public ownership 
also facilitates the market for corporate control. Thus, the 
signals from publicly traded securities in the capital market 
could discipline managers and resolve potential agency 
problems. Hence, whether there is a significant difference in 
the performance of publicly owned and privately held 
companies remains an empirical question.
While previous empirical studies have found evidence that 
management ownership appears to play a significant role in 
firm performance, their samples often include firms from a 
cross-section of industries.1 To the extent that ownership 
structure may depend on industrial characteristics, as argued 
by Jensen and Warner (1988), Demsetz (1983), and Fama and 
Jensen (1983), disentangling the relationship between 
performance and ownership becomes difficult. Moreover, 
many papers rely on certain corporate events—such as initial 
public offerings (IPOs) or leveraged buyouts, which are also 
likely to be endogenous to firm performance—to discern the 
effects of changes in ownership structure.2
In this paper, we employ a different empirical strategy to 
study the effects of ownership structure on firm perfor-
mance that is free from any corporate events in the rather 
homogenous banking industry. In essence, the performance of 
publicly traded bank holding companies (BHCs) is compared 
with that of privately held BHCs.3,4 By focusing on a single 
industry—banking—we control more precisely the effects of 
industrial organization on ownership structure. Within the 
banking industry, different firms may choose to organize 
themselves differently. To the extent that these firms all 
operate in the same industry with presumably very similar 
production functions, it seems plausible to view ownership 
structure as exogenous in this setting, especially after 
controlling for firm size.5 Thus, by focusing on a single 
industry, controlling for within-industry variations, and 
avoiding corporate events that may be associated with unusual 
performance (such as de novo banking or IPOs) and bank 
failures, this study contributes to the field by isolating the 
ownership effect more accurately.
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In addition, while other studies emphasize profitability in 
their performance comparisons, this paper also examines how 
ownership structure affects risk taking. According to the 
agency theory, managers with nondiversifiable human capital 
may take less risk than is optimal for shareholders. Although 
this agency problem could be mitigated by structuring the 
labor contract to induce the manager to move closer to optimal 
risk taking, such as by tying compensation to the stock price or 
including stock options as part of the manager’s compensation, 
it is an empirical question whether publicly traded BHCs take 
less risk than privately held ones.6
A larger question about the effects of ownership structure 
on bank risk taking is whether market discipline is capable of 
constraining bank risk taking.7 In recent years, policymakers 
and bank regulators have warmed to the idea of harnessing 
market forces to enhance banking supervision. This idea is 
motivated mainly by: 1) the growing complexity of large 
banking organizations, 2) concerns about the cost of bank 
supervision, and 3) limiting the bank safety net so that 
uninsured debtholders and equityholders still have incentives 
to monitor bank risks. Both the Federal Reserve and the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision are actively promoting the 
concept of market discipline in banking. In the new Basel 
Capital Accord, to be implemented by 2006, market discipline 
is one of the three pillars, along with capital regulation (Pillar 1) 
and banking supervision (Pillar 2), designed to safeguard the 
banking system.8 In the United States, Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan (2001) has remarked that “the real 
pre-safety-net discipline was from the market, and we need to 
adopt policies that promote private counterparty supervision 
as the first line of defense for a safe and sound banking system.” 
 Financial market discipline can influence bank risk taking 
as follows. The market price of publicly traded securities issued 
by a bank reflects the latest market assessment of the bank’s 
financial condition. By monitoring those market signals, 
market participants and bank regulators could influence a 
bank’s risk profile. For example, a bank’s counterparties may 
limit or withdraw their trading with the bank if the 
counterparty risk is deemed unacceptable by market 
participants. With up-to-date market information, banking 
regulators could use their supervisory power to force bank 
management to reduce risk taking. Just the threat of market 
and regulatory responses to unfavorable market signals by itself 
has the potential to constrain bank risk taking.  But whether 
market forces actually limit bank risk taking remains an open 
question.
This paper defines market discipline as the effects of publicly 
available market signals from bank-issued securities that lead 
to less risk taking by the issuing bank, relative to otherwise 
similar banks that do not issue publicly traded securities. Thus, 
the criterion by which we determine if market discipline works 
is that it not only forces a publicly traded bank to make the 
appropriate trade-off between risk and return, it must also be 
able to reduce the bank’s overall risk relative to that of banks 
not subject to market discipline. Also note that it is the net 
difference in risk taking between a privately held and a publicly 
traded BHC that matters, not just the changes in risk taking in 
a public BHC because of its market signal.9
Previous research on market discipline in banking focuses 
narrowly on whether bank security prices are efficient in 
reflecting bank risks. While bank-issued securities, including 
bank stock and subordinated debt, do seem to reflect bank risk 
taking accurately,10 this kind of market discipline does not 
necessarily affect banks’ overall riskiness. Banks may still take 
large amounts of risk as long as the banks, and their investors, 
are properly compensated for bearing these risks. In this paper, 
the question concerning market discipline is different: Does the 
presence of readily available bank security prices result in lower 
asset risk, on net, by publicly traded banking companies? There 
has been very little research into whether market forces are 
capable of influencing banking firms’ behavior. To our 
knowledge, Bliss and Flannery (2002) is the only paper to 
examine this question. Using a sample of publicly traded 
BHCs, the authors find little evidence that stock or bond 
investors influence managerial actions, casting doubt on the 
effectiveness of the market in shaping managers’ behavior. 
Here, we approach the same question from a different angle. 
Rather than looking at managerial actions, we focus on the end 
results by comparing the performance and risk taking of 
publicly traded BHCs with the performance and risk taking of 
their privately held counterparts. Although our criterion for 
the operation of market discipline is whether a BHC issues 
stock that is publicly traded, the analysis subsumes any 
disciplining effects from the bond market, since all BHCs that 
issue bonds publicly have publicly traded stock.11
Other papers have studied the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance in the banking or 
thrift industry. Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) find that 
between 1978 and 1985, bank risk declined with managerial 
ownership, particularly during periods of deregulation. Their 
analysis uses a sample of only publicly traded banks. In the 
thrift industry, Cole and Mehran (1998) examine the stock 
price performance of thrift institutions that converted from 
mutual to stock ownership. Their focus was on the regulatory 
restrictions of ownership and stock performance. Esty (1997) 
and Schrand and Unal (1998) study the changes in risk taking 
when savings and loan associations were converted from 
mutual to stock ownership. Both studies find increases in risk 
after mutual thrifts were converted to stock institutions. Their 
findings seem to indicate that exposing thrifts’ stocks to capital 
market discipline tends to raise, rather than lower, risk taking. 
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endogenous to firm performance and thus could confound the 
pure ownership effect. Our methodology is designed to be free 
of such potential endogeneity.
Our first key finding is that publicly owned banking 
companies on average are less profitable than privately held 
BHCs. To the extent that publicly owned BHCs are found to 
incur significantly higher operating costs per dollar of assets 
than private BHCs, operating inefficiency is one contributing 
factor to public companies’ subpar profitability. The results 
are consistent with the agency theory prediction that the 
separation of ownership and control will lead to shirking and 
perquisite consumption that undermine performance, and that 
the availability of public market signals from bank security 
prices does not fully curb this incentive.
The second key finding is that risk between publicly held 
and privately owned banking companies—whether measured 
by loan portfolio quality or earnings variability—is statistically 
indistinguishable. This finding casts doubt on the effectiveness 
of market discipline in limiting banks’ portfolio risk. However, 
we do find that publicly held BHCs on average tend to hold 
significantly more capital than their private counterparts, 
providing some empirical support for proponents of market 
discipline in banking. The tendency of public BHCs to hold 
more capital also conforms with the agency theory.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes the data and provides summary statistics for the 
sample banking firms. In Section 3, we discuss the 
methodology and the empirical predictions under both the 
agency theory and the market discipline theory. Our empirical 
findings appear in Section 4.
2.D a t a
To construct a sample of publicly traded and privately held 
banking firms, we begin with all BHCs that have filed 
Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding 
Companies (FR Y-9C Reports) with the Federal Reserve from 
1986 to 2001. Federal regulation requires all BHCs with total 
consolidated assets of $150 million or more to file this report 
quarterly. To avoid double counting of multitiered BHCs, we 
retain only the top-tier ones. We then match these BHCs to 
their commercial bank subsidiaries that file Reports of 
Condition and Income (Call Reports) to determine the total 
banking assets controlled by each BHC. To ensure that our 
sample includes only BHCs that engage mainly in banking 
activities, we exclude those with more than 10 percent of assets 
in nonbanking subsidiaries. We control for the BHC’s 
geographic location by using the Federal Reserve District in 
which the BHC is located and exclude all off-shore BHCs. 
To control for the possibility of unusual performance due to 
de novo banking, bank failure, IPO, or takeover, we eliminate 
the first and last years of observations for each BHC that does 
not have a complete time series of data in either the public or 
the private samples.12 Moreover, firms that report unusually 
low or unusually high operating costs per dollar of assets, 
defined as below the 5th percentile or above the 95th percentile, 
respectively, are also removed from the sample. These criteria 
yield a preliminary sample of 12,518 firm-years.
For the ownership variable, we distinguish between public 
and private ownership by whether a BHC issues publicly traded 
stock. Unlike prior studies, we do not use the fraction of 
managerial ownership to measure ownership structure because 
ownership data are generally unavailable for privately held 
banking companies.13 Moreover, our ownership variable is 
natural in testing the disciplining effects of having readily 
available market prices of publicly traded securities, the 
prerequisite for market discipline in banking.
To determine whether a BHC is publicly held in a certain 
year, we match the BHC data with the common stock data from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) by the name 
of the banking company. To confirm that a BHC’s stock is the 
one identified in the CRSP data, we use the CUSIP number 
from CRSP to look up the total assets with the same CUSIP in 
Compustat and compare them with the reported total assets in 
the FR Y-9C Reports. This classification method assigns 3,313 
observations to the public sample and 9,205 observations to the 
private sample.
In a comparison of the performance of publicly held BHCs 
with that of their privately held counterparts, an important 
dimension to control for is a possible scale effect, since publicly 
traded firms tend to be larger than privately held firms. 
Another reason for controlling for the size effect in the banking 
industry is that large money center or regional banks often have 
a different emphasis on their product and funding mix than do 
smaller community banks. Hence, when comparing the two 
types of firms, we want the two subsamples of publicly owned 
and privately held BHCs to be as homogenous as possible.
To control for firm size, we assign each sample observation 
a size quartile. Since public firms tend to be larger than private 
firms, firm size from the private sample is used to determine 
the cutoffs for each size class to ensure that for each size class 
public and private firms are comparable in size. Specifically, for 
each sample year, we first sort the total assets of all private 
BHCs. Firms with total assets at or above the 90th percentile are 
assigned Size Class 1, firms with total assets at or above the 75th 
percentile but below the 90th percentile are assigned Size 
Class 2, firms with total assets at or above the 50th percentile 
but below the 75th percentile are assigned Size Class 3, and 
firms with total assets below the 50th percentile are assigned 
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of private BHCs in each size class at each year, we compare the 
total assets of each public BHC at each year with those size class 
cutoffs and assign public BHCs to size classes accordingly. The 
very large public BHCs whose total assets exceed the maximum 
total assets of private BHCs in Size Class 1 are eliminated from 
the sample. Hence, for each size class at each year, the largest 
BHC is always a private company. This practice is to ensure that 
our results are not driven by the very large publicly traded 
BHCs that are not directly comparable with those that are 
privately held.14 In addition, after all remaining public BHCs 
are assigned to each of the four size classes, we determine the 
smallest public BHC in Size Class 4 at each year. All private 
BHCs whose total assets are smaller than those of the smallest 
public BHC at each year are also eliminated from the sample. 
Again, this practice is to ensure that the results are not driven 
by the very small privately held BHCs that do not have directly 
comparable public counterparts. Dropping the very large 
public BHCs and the very small private BHCs from the sample 
reduces its size to 10,821 firm-years.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the final sample, 
covering the entire period from 1986 to 2001. As expected, the 
number of observations for the public sample is skewed toward 
the larger size quartile, with 1,812 observations in the Size 
Class 1 public sample but only 986 in the private sample for 
that size class. The private sample has the exact opposite skew, 
with 3,091 observations in the private sample for Size Class 4 
firms but only 149 observations in the public sample. Except 
for the largest size class, the mean and median total assets for 
public and private firms are very similar, suggesting that these 
firms with different ownership structures are indeed compar-
able in size. In the largest size class, despite our effort to control 
for size differences, the mean and median public firms are 
almost twice as large as the average private firm. Nevertheless, 
we know that the largest firm in that size class is always a private 
firm in each of the sampling years.
3. Empirical Strategy
To compare the performance of public and private BHCs, we 
focus on three areas: profitability, operating efficiency, and risk 
taking. All three performance dimensions are measured by 
accounting variables. Profitability is measured by return on 
assets (ROA), which is defined as net income after tax divided 
by end-of-year total assets. Operating efficiency is measured by 
the ratio of total operating costs, including labor, occupancy, 
and equipment expenses, to total assets (OPCOST). Risk taking 
is measured in three ways. The first is the ratio of bad loans, 
including both past due loans and nonaccural loans, to total 
loans (BADLOAN). The second is earnings variability, which is 
the standard deviation of ROA using quarterly observations 
(SDROA).15 The third is capitalization, which is the ratio of 
equity capital, including preferred stock, common stock, and 
retained earnings, to total assets (CAPITAL). Both BADLOAN 
and SDROA capture the amount of asset risk in a banking 
firm’s portfolio. CAPITAL measures the ability of the banking 
firm to absorb losses. Firms with more capital are considered 
less risky, ceteris paribus. ROA, OPCOST, BADLOAN, 
SDROA, and CAPITAL are all expressed in percent.
Bivariate analysis is conducted to compare the performance 
of public and private BHCs. In essence, we compare the 
distribution of each accounting measure of performance 
between publicly owned and privately held BHCs using the 
nonparametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum test separately for each 
size class.16 The Z-statistic for the Wilcoxon Rank Sum test is 
approximately normally distributed under the null hypothesis 
that the private sample and the public sample have the same 
distribution. This test statistic is calculated for the smaller 
sample size of the subject samples, that is, the private sample 
for Size Class 1 firms and the public sample for Size Class 2, 3, 
and 4 firms. For robustness, we also break down the sample 
period into three subperiods: 1986-90, 1991-95, and 1996-
2001.
The first subperiod was characterized by tremendous 
difficulties in the banking industry. The banking sector was 
suffering from the worst crisis since the Great Depression; the 
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics, 1986-2001










1 2,145.4 1,812 1,118.9 986
(1,491.3) (778.0)
2 451.3 520 420.8 1,471
(442.6) (413.1)
3 293.3 347 270.8 2,445
(290.6) (267.1)
4 197.3 149 188.0 3,091
(201.1) (187.5)
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Federal Reserve 
FR Y-9C Reports.
Notes: The table presents the mean and median total assets of the sample 
of publicly owned and privately held bank holding companies (BHCs), in 
millions of dollars, by ownership status and size class. Size Class 1 contains 
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total number of bank failures exceeded 200 in both 1987 and 
1989 and peaked at 279 in 1988. During the second subperiod, 
the banking industry was gradually coming out of the crisis 
while the economy was recovering from the recession after the 
first Gulf War. Accordingly, the banking sector was stabilizing 
and returning to profitability. The last subperiod was marked 
by a fast-growing economy and financial market booms; 
profitability of banking firms soared to a record level while 
asset quality improved markedly. Those were the banner years 
of the banking industry.
The agency theory predicts that publicly traded BHCs will 
tend to be less profitable, less efficient, and less risky than 
comparable privately held institutions. According to the 
market discipline theory, for market discipline to have an 
effect, publicly traded BHCs that constantly signal their 
financial well-being to market participants through their stock 
prices must be less risky, on net, than their privately held 
counterparts that do not emit such signals.
4. Empirical Findings
4.1 Profitability
A bivariate comparison of ROA between public and private 
BHCs is offered in Table 2. For the firms in the two larger size 
classes, the average privately held BHC in general has a higher 
ROA than the average publicly held BHC for both the overall 
period and the three subperiods, but the differences are not 
statistically significant. The only exception is in subperiod 
1986-90 for firms in Size Class 2: both the mean and the 
median ROAs for the public sample are higher than they are 
for the private sample, and the differences are marginally 
significant. For the firms in the two smaller size classes (3 and 
4), the mean and the median ROAs of privately held BHCs are 
significantly higher than those of public BHCs. For Size Class 3 
firms, the results are robust with respect to the two later 
subperiods; for Size Class 4 firms, the comparisons are robust 
with respect to all three subperiods. The findings in Table 2 
indicate that for larger firms, publicly owned and privately held 
BHCs are about equally profitable. However, for smaller BHCs, 
privately held firms are significantly more profitable than 
publicly traded companies, averaging between 15 and 30 basis 
points in ROA.
Table 2











1 1986-2001 0.93 1.01 0.4784
(1.01) (1.02) (0.6324)
1986-90 0.71 0.74 -0.9855
(0.89) (0.81) (0.3244)
1991-95 0.98 1.00 -0.2312
(1.07) (1.05) (0.8172)
1996-2001 1.09 1.20 -0.3248
(1.10) (1.08) (0.7453)
2 1986-2001 0.97 0.98 -0.3522
(0.99) (1.03) (0.7247)
1986-90 0.92 0.75 1.8566*
(0.89) (0.86) (0.0634)
1991-95 0.88 0.99 -1.5066
(0.97) (1.05) (0.1319)
1996-2001 1.05 1.12 -1.1584
(1.04) (1.09) (0.2467)
3 1986-2001 0.83 0.95 -2.3744**
(0.95) (1.00) (0.0176)
1986-90 0.66 0.72 0.4660
(0.93) (0.82) (0.6412)
1991-95 0.69 0.95 -2.7782***
(0.89) (1.01) (0.0055)
1996-2001 0.97 1.10 -3.2390***
(0.98) (1.09) (0.0012)
4 1986-2001 0.69 0.98 -4.3651***
(0.93) (1.03) (<0.0001)
1986-90 0.26 0.55 -2.0067**
(0.29) (0.70) (0.0448)
1991-95 0.46 1.00 -3.5472***
(0.81) (1.04) (0.0004)
1996-2001 0.92 1.15 -4.0366***
(0.99) (1.12) (<0.0001)
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Federal Reserve 
FR Y-9C Reports.
Notes: The table reports the mean and median return on assets, in 
percent, of publicly owned and privately held bank holding companies 
(BHCs), by size class and sample period. The Wilcoxon Rank Sum 
statistic, Z, is calculated for the smaller sample, that is, the private sample 
for Size Class 1 and the public sample for Size Class 2, 3, and 4. Size Class 1 
contains the largest firms.
***Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
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4.2 Operating Efficiency
Table 3 presents a bivariate comparison of operating efficiency 
between public and private BHCs. Except for Size Class 1 firms, 
strong evidence of higher operating costs per dollar of assets 
among publicly owned companies is found, and the Wilcoxon 
Z-statistic is significant at the 1 percent level for all three size 
classes. The results are also fairly robust with respect to 
subperiods. For the overall period, the differences in mean 
operating costs between public and private BHCs are 11 basis 
points for Size Class 2 firms, 22 basis points for Size Class 3 
firms, and 34 basis points for Size Class 4 firms. Note that the 
difference in mean operating costs narrows as firm size 
increases. For Size Class 1 firms, there is some evidence that 
privately held BHCs incurred higher operating costs than 
public BHCs did during the 1996-2001 subperiod, but the 
difference is only marginally significant. Results in Table 3 
reveal that except for the large banking firms, publicly traded 
BHCs tend to be less efficient than privately owned banking 
companies.
4.3 Risk Taking
Our bivariate comparison of the first measure of risk taking, 
BADLOAN, can be found in Table 4. Only BHCs in Size Class 2 
exhibit a significantly different bad loan ratio between private 
and public firms for the full sample period. The finding that 
private BHCs in Size Class 2 have significantly more bad loans 
than do public BHCs appears to be driven by the last 
subperiod, 1996-2001. No significant difference is found in the 
other two subperiods. For Size Class 1 firms, although privately 
held BHCs have more bad loans than do public BHCs during 
the 1986-90 subperiod, the result is only marginally significant 
and the relationship reverses course during the 1991-95 
subperiod. For Size Class 3 firms, not only are public BHCs less 
profitable than privately owned BHCs, they also have 
significantly more bad loans than their private counterparts do 
during the 1991-95 subperiod. Overall, the findings in Table 4 
do not seem to exhibit a strong pattern in loan quality 
differences between public and private banking firms.
Table 5 offers a bivariate comparison of the second measure 
of risk taking, earnings volatility, between public and private 
firms. For the full sample period, the standard deviation of 
ROA is similar between public and private BHCs, and none of 
the full period comparison is significant. For the subperiod 
analysis, privately held BHCs are found to have significantly 
higher earnings volatility in one of the three subperiods for Size 
Class 1 and 2 firms, while publicly owned BHCs are found to 
have significantly higher earnings volatility in one of the three 
subperiods for Size Class 3 and 4 firms. As in the analysis of 
BADLOAN, overall the bivariate comparison of earnings 
volatility does not reveal any significant pattern across the two 
types of banking firms. For robustness, we also compute the 
Table 3











1 1986-2001 2.09 2.15 -0.7419
(2.07) (2.04) (0.4582)
1986-90 2.19 2.22 -0.7484
(2.18) (2.12) (0.4542)
1991-95 2.11 2.09 -1.4483
(2.11) (2.04) (0.1475)
1996-2001 1.98 2.15 1.8501*
(1.95) (2.00) (0.0643)
2 1986-2001 2.20 2.09 4.3945***
(2.11) (1.99) (<0.0001)
1986-90 2.51 2.11 5.5106***
(2.28) (2.01) (<0.0001)
1991-95 2.24 2.11 3.8594***
(2.19) (1.97) (0.0001)
1996-2001 2.02 2.07 -0.5149
(2.00) (1.99) (0.6066)
3 1986-2001 2.30 2.08 5.9056***
(2.15) (2.01) (<0.0001)
1986-90 2.65 2.18 4.2172***
(2.46) (2.07) (<0.0001)
1991-95 2.37 2.04 5.4375***
(2.27) (2.00) (<0.0001)
1996-2001 2.14 2.04 2.1472**
(2.05) (2.00) (0.0318)
4 1986-2001 2.42 2.08 5.9383***
(2.19) (2.01) (<0.0001)
1986-90 3.16 2.17 5.9293***
(3.17) (2.06) (<0.0001)
1991-95 2.60 2.03 5.1012***
(2.36) (1.98) (<0.0001)
1996-2001 2.15 2.07 1.5236
(2.10) (1.99) (0.1276)
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Federal Reserve 
FR Y-9C Reports.
Notes: The table reports the mean and median ratio of total operating 
costs to total assets, in percent, of publicly owned and privately held 
bank holding companies (BHCs), by size class and sample period. The
Wilcoxon Rank Sum statistic, Z, is calculated for the smaller sample, that 
is, the private sample for Size Class 1 and the public sample for Size 
Class 2, 3, and 4. Size Class 1 contains the largest firms.
***Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2004 103
Table 4











1 1986-2001 1.35 1.33 -1.2753
(0.89) (0.90) (0.2022)
1986-90 1.91 2.15 1.7618*
(1.34) (1.54) (0.0781)
1991-95 1.45 1.27 -2.1233**
(0.98) (0.88) (0.0337)
1996-2001 0.76 0.84 0.2646
(0.66) (0.65) (0.7913)
2 1986-2001 1.22 1.29 -2.1057**
(0.77) (0.89) (0.0352)
1986-90 1.62 1.99 -1.0198
(1.39) (1.37) (0.3078)
1991-95 1.62 1.27 0.3824
(0.90) (0.96) (0.7022)
1996-2001 0.78 0.86 -2.0907**
(0.56) (0.65) (0.0366)
3 1986-2001 1.50 1.39 0.3810
(0.91) (0.89) (0.7032)
1986-90 2.32 2.17 0.7730
(1.89) (1.61) (0.4395)
1991-95 2.06 1.46 3.0214***
(1.32) (0.96) (0.0025)
1996-2001 0.90 0.85 -0.2192
(0.66) (0.67) (0.8265)
4 1986-2001 1.27 1.34 -0.3877
(0.81) (0.85) (0.6982)
1986-90 2.18 2.45 -1.6348
(1.14) (1.85) (0.1021)
1991-95 1.50 1.33 0.4386
(0.83) (0.85) (0.6610)
1996-2001 0.93 0.87 1.0357
(0.72) (0.65) (0.3004)
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Federal Reserve 
FR Y-9C Reports.
Notes: The table reports the mean and median ratio of past due and non-
accrual loans to total assets, in percent, of publicly owned and privately 
held bank holding companies (BHCs), by size class and sample period. 
The Wilcoxon Rank Sum statistic, Z, is calculated for the smaller sample, 
that is, the private sample for Size Class 1 and the public sample for Size 
Class 2, 3, and 4. Size Class 1 contains the largest firms.
***Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 5











1 1986-2001 0.12 0.11 -0.0606
(0.08) (0.08) (0.9517)
1986-90 0.12 0.13 0.3260
(0.06) (0.07) (0.7444)
1991-95 0.09 0.08 1.7437*
(0.05) (0.07) (0.0812)
1996-2001 0.07 0.07 0.9152
(0.04) (0.05) (0.3601)
2 1986-2001 0.16 0.14 -0.1809
(0.06) (0.08) (0.8564)
1986-90 0.09 0.11 0.1998
(0.06) (0.06) (0.8417)
1991-95 0.16 0.10 0.4924
(0.07) (0.07) (0.6224)
1996-2001 0.06 0.08 -2.1743**
(0.04) (0.07) (0.0297)
3 1986-2001 0.18 0.16 1.6025
(0.19) (0.08) (0.1090)
1986-90 0.12 0.13 0.9408
(0.11) (0.08) (0.3468)
1991-95 0.17 0.10 1.8215*
(0.11) (0.07) (0.0685)
1996-2001 0.09 0.07 0.4921
(0.07) (0.06) (0.6227)
4 1986-2001 0.22 0.09 0.7006
(0.07) (0.06) (0.4835)
1986-90 0.27 0.14 1.8263*
(0.27) (0.09) (0.0678)
1991-95 0.24 0.10 1.3148
(0.10) (0.08) (0.1886)
1996-2001 0.06 0.08 -0.8914
(0.05) (0.06) (0.3727)
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Federal Reserve 
FR Y-9C Reports.
Notes: The table reports the mean and median standard deviation of 
return on assets, in percent, of publicly owned and privately held 
bank holding companies (BHCs), by size class and sample period. The
Wilcoxon Rank Sum statistic, Z, is calculated for the smaller sample, that 
is, the private sample for Size Class 1 and the public sample for Size 
Class 2, 3, and 4. Size Class 1 contains the largest firms.
***Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.104 Risk and Return
ROA and its standard deviation by replacing the net income 
with the less volatile operating earnings before tax and 
extraordinary items. Qualitatively similar results are found 
with the alternative measure of ROA.
Finally, a comparison of the third dimension of risk, 
capitalization, is presented in Table 6. For smaller banking 
firms in Size Class 3 and 4, publicly owned BHCs tend to hold 
significantly more capital than do privately held BHCs, 
averaging about 40 to 50 basis points. Although these publicly 
held BHCs are also found to hold more capital than private 
BHCs hold during the subperiods, the difference is significant 
only in the first subperiod for Size Class 4 firms. In the 1991-95 
subperiod, publicly owned BHCs in the two larger size 
quartiles, Size Class 1 and 2, are also found to have significantly 
more capital than privately held BHCs, averaging about 50 and 
30 basis points, respectively. Overall, the bivariate results 
suggest that publicly held BHCs tend to hold more capital than 
privately held BHCs, on the order of about 40 to 50 basis points 
on average, when the average capital-to-asset ratio in the 
banking industry is about 8 to 9 percent.
5. Summary and Conclusions
This paper conducts a straightforward test of the agency 
theory and the market discipline theory by comparing the 
performance of a large sample of publicly owned and privately 
held firms in the rather homogenous banking industry. The 
three areas of performance analyzed are profitability, operating 
efficiency, and risk taking. We find that smaller publicly owned 
BHCs tend to be less profitable than similar sized privately held 
BHCs, on the order of 15 to 30 basis points when the return on 
assets averages about 1 percentage point. The results are robust 
with respect to sample period. Because these smaller publicly 
owned BHCs are also found to hold more capital than privately 
held BHCs hold, the difference in return on equity would be 
more pronounced. One source of lower profitability among 
publicly owned banking companies is their operating 
inefficiency, as the operating costs in public BHCs are found to 
be significantly higher on average than those in private BHCs, 
on the order of 10 to 30 basis points of operating costs per 
dollar of assets. BHCs in the smallest size class that exhibit the 
greatest difference in return on assets are also found to have the 
greatest difference in operating costs, bolstering the link 
between profitability and operating efficiency.
Loan quality or earnings variability are comparable across 
public and private BHCs. However, publicly owned BHCs are 
found to hold significantly more capital than their private 
counterparts hold, averaging about 40 to 50 basis points more 
among the smaller BHCs, while the capital ratio averages about 
8 to 9 percentage points in the banking industry.
The results are consistent with the theory that separating 
ownership from control can lead to shirking and perquisite 
Table 6











1 1986-2001 8.05 8.06 -1.1412
(7.94) (7.85) (0.2538)
1986-90 7.10 7.07 -0.9595
(7.00) (6.88) (0.3373)
1991-95 8.51 7.99 -5.0450***
(8.49) (7.85) (<0.0001)
1996-2001 8.60 8.74 0.3040
(8.45) (8.57) (0.7611)
2 1986-2001 8.53 8.44 1.2770
(8.43) (8.27) (0.2016)
1986-90 7.47 7.54 -0.3362
(7.41) (7.30) (0.7367)
1991-95 8.66 8.37 1.6947*
(8.60) (8.14) (0.0901)
1996-2001 9.02 9.08 0.0398
(8.98) (8.91) (0.9682)
3 1986-2001 8.61 8.22 4.2188***
(8.69) (8.07) (<0.0001)
1986-90 7.81 7.24 1.4387
(7.59) (7.22) (0.1502)
1991-95 8.33 8.14 1.5663
(8.57) (8.01) (0.1173)
1996-2001 9.04 8.89 1.5918
(8.90) (8.66) (0.1114)
4 1986-2001 9.06 8.57 2.0541**
(8.88) (8.44) (0.0400)
1986-90 8.83 6.99 2.5409**
(7.54) (6.83) (0.0111)
1991-95 7.98 8.27 -0.5286
(7.91) (8.16) (0.5971)
1996-2001 9.71 9.47 0.4782
(9.24) (9.32) (0.6325)
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Federal Reserve 
FR Y-9C Reports.
Notes: The table reports the mean and median capital-to-asset ratio, in 
percent, of publicly owned and privately held bank holding companies 
(BHCs), by size class and sample period. The Wilcoxon Rank Sum statis-
tic, Z, is calculated for the smaller sample, that is, the private sample for 
Size Class 1 and the public sample for Size Class 2, 3, and 4. Size Class 1 
contains the largest firms.
***Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2004 105
consumption by management, thereby compromising 
operating efficiency and profitability. The agency theory 
prediction of less risk taking by publicly traded BHCs is also 
partially borne out by the data, as evidenced by the tendency 
of these BHCs to hold significantly more capital.
While providing support for the agency theory, our 
evidence is somewhat mixed on the market discipline theory. 
In terms of portfolio risk, the availability of constant market 
signals for publicly traded BHCs hardly leads to any detectable 
differences in loan portfolio quality or earnings variability 
compared with that of otherwise similar privately held firms. 
Public BHCs do hold significantly more capital. Since capital is 
the ultimate buffer against bank failure, this by itself may be 
sufficient to argue for leveraging market forces to enhance the 
safety and soundness of the banking system.
Finally, in advocating the use of market discipline in 
banking, it is helpful to know what the market can and cannot 
do. Specifically, having a market signal is no panacea for 
limiting bank asset risk. Moreover, the agency costs of public 
ownership, in terms of both profitability and efficiency, should 
not be overlooked.Endnotes
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1. See, for example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988).
2. See, for example, Holthausen and Larcker (1996), Jain and Kini 
(1994), and Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997).
3. Hereafter, the term “bank” refers to a bank holding company.
4. In this paper, the ownership structure is proxied by whether a firm 
is publicly traded. The ownership proxy is discussed fully in Section 2.
5. One may still argue that ownership structure may be endogenous in 
portfolio composition. However, absent any convincing arguments in 
support of this, we assume here that ownership structure is not 
determined by portfolio characteristics.
6. Using a sample of large, publicly traded banking firms, Houston 
and James (1995) find that bank CEOs tend to receive less cash 
compensation, are less likely to participate in a stock option plan, hold 
fewer stock options, and receive a smaller percentage of their total 
compensation in the form of options and stock than do CEOs in other 
industries. However, the differences in compensation between 
publicly traded and privately held banks are less clear.
7. In this paper, we assume that the reduction of bank risk taking is 
socially desirable because of the externalities associated with bank 
failures.
8. Bank for International Settlements (2003).
9. The presence of a public market signal may lead a publicly traded 
BHC to take less risk at the margin. However, for market discipline to 
be considered successful in reducing bank risk taking, the overall risk 
of a publicly traded BHC must be less than the overall risk of an 
otherwise similar privately held BHC.
10. For details, see the survey paper by Flannery (1998).
11. Note that stockholders and bondholders may have different 
incentives for bank risk taking, due to their different claims on the 
bank. However, in this paper, market discipline works through the 
signals in both stock and bond prices to other market participants 
(that trade with the bank) and regulators—so the source of the market 
signal does not really matter.
12. Admittedly, this procedure eliminates only the short-term 
abnormalities in firm performance.
13. Studying a sample of IPO firms, Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah 
(1997) report that the median ownership stake of officers and 
directors in privately held companies is 68 percent, compared with 
a median stake of 18 percent in publicly traded companies.
14. Although the exclusion of very large publicly traded BHCs from 
the sample is an empirical necessity, it limits the analysis of market 
discipline on large banking firms. Market discipline of very large 
banking firms may be of particular importance because of the 
potential systemic implications of large bank failures.
15. To calculate the SDROA, we require firms with an incomplete time 
series of data to have at least twelve quarters of data for the full sample 
period and eight quarters of data for the subperiod. Otherwise, no 
SDROA is computed for these firms.
16. Results of the multivariate analysis are qualitatively similar and are 
presented in Kwan (2003).References
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